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Uzbekistan in the new world order*
MERYEM KIRIMLI
Since the Uzbek declaration of independence, there exists confusion not only in
the outside world, but in the very republic itself about the new place Uzbekistan
should take in the changing new world order. Many attempts have been made to
answer questions related to foreign policy in the post-independence era as well
as the type of political system this new republic will adopt. Questions come to
mind such as: Is Uzbekistan part of the Turkic world? Does it also have a share
in the Islamic world? Does Uzbekistan have anything to do with the countries
of the Middle East? Can Uzbekistan be considered as part of the 'Orient'?
Despite its declaration of independence, Uzbekistan still has strong ties to the old
centre, Moscow. Is it then appropriate to consider Uzbekistan part of the
Western world, if Russia is to be considered as such? The search to solve such
puzzles remains undefined in academic circles.
The Uzbek declaration of independence, within the country, and in all the
other Central Asian republics, caught many natives by surprise.1 There was no
structure existent in Uzbekistan ready to tackle the problems of independent
statehood. Yesterday's Communist Party nomenklatura suddenly found them-
selves the representatives of an independent state. As of 1993, some 130
countries in the world recognized Uzbekistan.2 It has established diplomatic
relations with more than 40 of them3 and Uzbek embassies began to be opened
in some tens of countries in the 'free world'. Four years after its declaration of
independence, Uzbekistan is now a country which has been admitted to many
important international organizations, including the United Nations and the
OSCE, Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Consolidation of the new Uzbek state required efforts such as the formation
of a new national identity, decolonization, Islamization, Turkification and
derussification. All efforts towards handling the aforementioned matters are at
the beginning stage. Discussion of such issues was visible in the Uzbek media
until the beginning of 1994. However, it soon became difficult for intellectuals
and academics in the outside world to monitor or forecast changes in the
republic, due to strict control of native export publications by the Uzbek
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administration. Nonetheless, certain signs indicate that the republic is answering
some of the vital questions towards defining the future of this newly independent
republic.
Problems of Uzbek identity and religion
Native press articles in Uzbekistan began to draw attention to a need to revitalize
the national history. Reinterpretation of so-called 'Uzbek History', the Soviet
past, the colonial past, and the emergence of the term 'Uzbek' were all subjects
discussed in the media until the end of 1994. Some Uzbek writers also submitted
to a belief that 'quarrels about the past are in fact struggles to control the future
...'4 and claimed a need for the appropriate interpretation of Uzbek history and
observation of historical events. Such intellectuals believed that it would help to
strengthen the destiny of the newly independent republic of Uzbekistan.5
Discussions about the specific periods of Uzbek history also began to appear
in the Uzbek press. The Timurid period, together with the discussions of the
Cedidist6 legacy were the two events that left a strong mark on the historical
consciousness of the Uzbek people.7 Attempts have also been made to discuss
the origin of the Uzbek people, dating as far back as the 16th century. Uzbek
writers Ahmadali Asqarov and Boribay Ahmedov claim that the history of the
Uzbeks started at least as early as the 10th century. The same writers also
suggest that 'Uzbeks are not Turks but rather a Turkic group, the language of
Uzbeks is Turkic but there is a great difference between the Turkish and the
Uzbek languages'.8
Attempts to discuss certain periods in Central Asian history result in an Uzbek
effort to find or define the 'Golden Age'9 of the Uzbek people. It seems difficult
to assign the Timurid period as the golden age to only the Uzbeks, based merely
on the fact that the tomb of Timur and many monumental buildings of the
Timurid dynasty are within the borders of today's Uzbekistan. On the other
hand, the Timurid legacy is unique not only to present day Uzbeks; all Central
Asian peoples and their ancestors have a share in it. The idea of claiming the
Timurid period as an era unique and common to the whole of Central Asian
people will undermine the present-day identities of all the individual republics
in Central Asia. Despite this fact, Uzbekistan has declared the current year as the
'Year of Timur'. It has also been forecast that in the case of regional unity in
Central Asia, whether it be built upon Islamic or pan-Turkic roots, Uzbekistan
is likely to display the tendency of attempting to play the regional hegemon or
the dominating nation.10 However, it remains to be seen whether Uzbeks will
attempt to dominate the region by claiming themselves as the inheritors of the
Timurid legacy.
Discussion of the Cedidist legacy also brings confusion to the maintenance of
Uzbek identity. Uzbek academicians like Begali Kasimov complained that
efforts in Uzbekistan are not sufficient to study and republish the Cedidist
material in the country. He points to the similarity of events in the first and last
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Kasimov was appointed chairman of a new department at Tashkent State
University. It was reported that this new department will focus on studying the
Cedidist period in Uzbek literature.12
At the beginning of this century, the original Cedidist movement started in
Central Asia with the strong influence of the Crimean Tatar intellectual and
publisher Ismail Bey Gaspirali, who, with his Tercuman/Perevodchik, was
widely read among the intellectuals of Turko-Muslims in Central Asia, the
Caucasus, the Volga-Ural region, Ottoman Turkey and as far away as Eastern
Turkestan and India.13 In 1914, for instance, Jadid schools in the Samarqand
oblast' were using books published in Kazan, Bakhchisarai, Tehran, and Bom-
bay.14 One Uzbek scholar, Abdujabbar A. Abduvakhitov, depicts the Cedids as
follows:
During the first decade of Soviet rule nearly all Jadid movement activists were executed,
including Munawwar-Qari, Abdulla Qadiriy, Chulpon, Abdur Rauf Fitrat, Usmon Nosir,
Tawallo, and many others. Their deaths do not mean that the movement was defeated. In
my opinion, Jadidism succeeded for the following reasons: The movement gave birth to the
awakening of national self-determination of Central Asian people, gave them modern
education, and brought positive changes in their political thinking. It was due to the Jadids'
efforts that there was a cultural renaissance in Central Asia. They wrote outstanding novels,
poems, and dramas, which are now famous not only in Central Asia but also in many other
countries. Jadidism was a real step forward to the national liberation of the Central Asian
people. Even in the field of religion there were many positive achievements, including
modernization of attitudes, renovation of past practices, and adaptation of Islam to modern
conditions. Jadidism made Islam a vital force ... Seventy years of Soviet repression were
not able to stop the influence of Jadidism ... Rather Jadidism and revivalism are two stages
of one process of gaining real independence and establishing of a sovereign state.15
The Crimean Tatar, Volga-Ural, Turkestani and Azerbaijani Cedidists were not
only in close contact with each other, but were also aware of the ideas of the
parallel-minded Turkish/Ottoman intellectuals.16 Publications, after indepen-
dence of the republic, began gradually to mention the Cedidist leaders such as
Mahmudxoja Behbudi (1875-1918), Abdullo Avlaniy (1878-1934), Abdurrauf
Fitrat (1886-1938), Cholpan (Abdulhamit Suleyman) (1897-1938).17 Except
Mahmudxoja Behbudi, all of these and many other Uzbek intellectuals became
the victims of the Stalinist Great Terror against the native intelligentsia in
Central Asia. Particularly, Mahmudxoja Behbudi, Abdullo Avlaniy, and Abdur-
rauf Fitrat followed the ideas of the Crimean Tatar Cedidist leader Ismail
Bey Gaspirali. It should also be noted that this fact was admitted in the post-
independent Uzbek publications.18 In the post-independence literature, a leading
Cedidist, Abdurrauf Fitrat, was depicted as one of the outstanding poets, writers
and dramatists, teachers and publicists who studied in the madrasas of Bukhara
and Istanbul. In 1909, he was admitted to the Dar'ulfunun (University) of
Istanbul and studied there until 1913. He wrote an article entitled 'Yasasin
Turkluk, Yasasin Islam'. (Long live Turkness, Long live Islam), in the pages of
Ulug Turkistan (Great Turkistan) dated 1917.19 The title of the article clearly

































In present-day Uzbekistan, there seems to be another fear of undermining
'Uzbekness' should there be too much emphasis placed upon the nature of
'Turkic' or 'Turkish' character. Nasimcan Rahmanov stated the following, ' ...
The understanding of "Turkness" is finding such a place in our vocabulary that
the concept of "Uzbek" is becoming increasingly meaningless and soulless'.20 It
seems that the strong regionalism or tribalism of the writer caused him anxiety
over losing Uzbek identity as a result of acquiring a more general Turkic
identity. The statement also indicates that at least a certain group of intellectuals
are worried about losing the loyalty of the Uzbek people to their newly formed
republic, and seem to view such behaviour as a threat to the Uzbek fatherland.
This is also clear evidence of confusion and departure by some Uzbek intellec-
tuals from the views of the Cedidists. Furthermore, it also demonstrates the
success of the Bolshevik 'divide and rule' policy for 70 years.
The Bolshevik administration divided Central Asia into different groups in
order to divide determinedly the area ethnically. It was an artificial and absurd
practice, alien to the characteristics of the region. However, during the 70-year
long Soviet rule, each of the Central Asian republics, though unnaturally, have
developed different identities. This phenomenon has complicated the crises of
identity, particularly in Uzbekistan and generally in the entirety of Central Asia.
Thus, it seems natural for the people of Central Asia to pay specific attention to
the search for their cultural and religious roots. This trend seems to be
particularly strong in Uzbekistan, compared to neighbouring republics. The
dominant position of the Uzbek population in the republic also gave impetus to
the activities in promoting Islam and Islamic studies, albeit unofficially.
In Uzbekistan today, rediscovery of the Cedidist legacy of the late 19th and
the early 20th century, among a group of intellectuals is a sign that the Uzbek
tendency is to depart from religious fundamentalism, and to contribute to a
secular and modern trend. Cedidist ideas of pre-revolutionary Turkestan aimed
to unite both the Turkic and the Islamic past of the society, while also
acknowledging the conditions of the modern age. The outstanding Cedidist poet,
Abdulhamid Suleyman (Cholpan) wrote in his famous poem Qozgalis (Revolt)
that the aim of the Cedidists was to get rid of the oppression of the traditional
leadership.21 In particular, the Young Bukharans during the pre-revolutionary era
struggled against traditionalist-conservatives in the Emirate. Those Young
Bukharans were the intelligentsia who wanted to establish close ties with
Istanbul, with special regard to matters of education. Some of the leading
members of this group visited or lived in Turkey after the 1908 Revolution,
including Abdurrauf Fitrat, Muhammedsharif Sufizade and Mahmudxoja Beh-
budi.22
In Uzbekistan, there is a very close relationship between the ideas of Cedidists
and the interpretation of Islamic traditions and principles. Unofficial religious
study groups in Fergana, Namangan and Andijan, have reportedly studied
pre-revolutionary Cedidist books.23 It is true that in Uzbekistan, religious
tendencies are deep-rooted and far stronger than in any other Central Asian
































UZBEKISTAN IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
activities. It has been reported that it is the old Cedidist ideas that these activities
draw their inspiration from.24 History also indicates that if the control is left
to the people, there will definitely be more inclination towards Islamic
and Turkic traditional tendencies. In such cases, of course, the authority of
the current leadership in Uzbekistan will be challenged with a new generation
of leaders with different assessments and values. President Karimov seemed
well aware of this fact when he banned the opposition parties of Birlik and
Erk from political activity in the country and exiled the leaders of the
two parties. At the same time, Karimov also aimed to secure his rear when he
acted decidedly against the Islamic democratic opposition in neighbouring
Tajikistan.
National identity and religion are the two pillars of Central Asian leaders,
and they are exercising them to consolidate their new states. Thus, Islam
Karimov of Uzbekistan began to cite in his speeches the Cedidist leaders
whose names were forbidden during Soviet rule. Although the names of Abdulla
Qadiri, Abdulhamid Suleyman (Cholpan), Abdurrauf Fitrat, and Osman Nasir
were rehabilitated in the mid-1950s, not much actual writing has been
done about them. According to the Uzbek president, the fairest judgement
about those who were 'martyred for the freedom of our people and the
land' arrived with the attainment of Uzbek independence.25 The religious
heritage of Central Asian Muslims has also found support in the republican
leadership. In the words of Professor Kemal Karpat, '... today Islam in Central
Asia is a source of national culture and an avenue for political leaders to court
popular support and identify themselves with the masses.'26 Islam Karimov
describes two holy days of Islam, the Ramadan Xayt (Eid-Bayram) and Qurban
Xayt as the two important milestones of the spiritual and religious heritage of the
Uzbek people. Karimov also stated that, observance of 'such events will help to
awaken the respect and belief of the people in their leaders and to the
administration'.27
Furthermore, President Karimov rejects the assessment that the observance
of religious holy days is a tribute to Islamicist groups. He argues that the
official observance of the two holy days should be seen as the awakening of
traditional values among the people, and particularly towards respect for their
forebears.28
Uzbek President Islam Karimov reported early in 1992 that when he visited
Mecca, he thanked God for the delivery of freedom and independence to the
Uzbek people. He wrote the following: 'When we were allowed to enter Kaaba,
I prayed to God for my people. I believed that I did not go there for an empty
purpose. We have received so much respect and not with an empty purpose, it
is due to the good grace of God.'29 This behaviour, however, is not unique to
Karimov. It seems to be the current attitude among the majority of leaders in
Central Asia. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev also publicized his visit to
Ravza-i Mutahhara in Madina, where he prayed before the tomb of the Prophet


































Is Karimov an 'Oriental despot'?
It seems that those who engage in deciphering the path taken by newly
independent Uzbekistan must necessarily ask themselves the above-stated
question. Is the president of Uzbekistan an 'Oriental despot'? This question is
the natural conclusion of those who engage in the pre-revolutionary history of
the area. It is almost impossible not to draw parallels with autocratic leaders
of the pre-revolutionary Turkestan Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, with that of
the current Uzbek leader after examining the violations of human rights and
abuses visited upon the Uzbek opposition party leaders. Jeri Laber, an executive
director of the International Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Organization, said
that 'Uzbekistan remains one of the last bastions of Communist-type dictatorship
on the territory of the former Soviet Union'.31 Members of opposition parties
have been beaten by the police in the streets or arrested on false charges in
Uzbekistan. Karimov has banned all opposition parties, maintains tight media
censorship and oversees a strict supervision of government personnel. He has
rebuffed Western criticism of human rights abuses by citing a need for strong
executive powers to guard against danger from conflicts in neighbouring
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Uzbek human rights activists are even barred from
attending conferences and meetings abroad. Uzbek secret police have several
times attempted to abduct opposition figures in attendance at such conferences,
and such members of the opposition are currently either in jail or in exile hiding
from the Uzbek secret police. During one such conference organized in Turkey,
the Uzbek Embassy withdrew from the conference due to an invitation to one of
the exiled Uzbek opposition leaders to the same conference in 1994.
The exiled leader of the Uzbek opposition party Erk, Muhammed Salih, made
a speech in Borne in the Netherlands on 10 June 1995, and the following is an
excerpt of that speech in which he has reported the current political, economic
conditions and criticized the current Uzbek leadership:32
The most frequent slogan by Uzbek parliamentarians is, 'Long Live the "Silence"!' and
'Long live our smartest president'. In the Uzbek constitution, there is a space for a
democratic president, however in practice it does not exist. Instead there is an autocrat.
There is no single branch of the government that exists without the control of the centre.
Even agreements between trading firms are considered legal only after obtaining presiden-
tial approval. All of the foreign firms in Uzbekistan are subject to presidential permission.
The basis of our free market economy is the black market. Bribery and corruption are the
foundations of our economy. An official who does not receive and give bribes, or those
who do not engage in corruption immediately finds himself out of a job. 95% of all the
population in Uzbekistan is poverty-stricken. The rich are the ones who comprise the other
5% who belong to the nomenklatura. That is to say, the deputies, judges and police officers.
There is no middle class in the country. On the one hand, there is a small group of bribed
rich and on the other, there is a magnificent army of the poor ... In our constitution, there
are articles related to the multi-party system. There are four parties (in Uzbekistan) whose
activities are officially permitted. All of these (parties) consist of old communists, which
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opposition parties, the ones which do not fit into 'his' (the monarch, i.e. the president)
pocket have for years been persecuted and terrorized.
What is the primary objection of the opposition to the Karimov regime? During the
pre-Independence years, in 1988 and 1989, we asked the administration to launch reform
programmes in politics and the economy. Those were the reforms which would have made
us step forward towards a process of gradual democratization. We have supported stability
in the country. It was impossible to achieve reform without stability. Unfortunately, the
administration misused our position. They used it instead to strengthen their control, and
as a result, Uzbekistan was made a police-state. Today in Uzbekistan, there is no freedom
but there is stability. However, this stability looks more like the stability of a graveyard (or
the silence of a graveyard). The (word) stability is a wonderful card in the hands of our
dictators. Western leaders who are the fans of human rights and democracy, cannot oppose
our dictators in the face of this card (stability).
(Some sentences omitted.)
Uzbekistan is the cradle of Turkish civilization. There are currently 23 million people
living in Uzbekistan. It would be wrong to assume that these people are hungry only for
bread. Our people are in need of freedom together with bread. I would like to have my
voice reach my brothers in Turkey. Turkey should help Uzbekistan in its democratization
process. We do. not need Turkish investment and credits that will help the current regime
in Uzbekistan to become even stronger!
Of course Turkey is right in considering Uzbekistan as brother, and so its president
Karimov. However, people who are suffering under the oppression of 'brother Karimov'
are also your brothers. I wish Turkish government would pay more attention to the
suffering of these masses.
Uzbek economy
Economic development is believed to be the key to maintaining social and
political stability in Uzbekistan. Irrigation policies and efforts to increase cotton
production in Uzbekistan are one of the reasons that have led to present
economic conditions in this newly independent republic. It has also led to the
desiccation of the Aral Sea and is threatening the very survival of the Karakalpak
people in the area. During the Soviet period, industrial investment in the area has
been neglected at the expense of short-term agricultural goals. However, seven
decades of Soviet economic, military, and political policy has made the area
dependent upon the old centre of Moscow despite the four years that have
elapsed since independence. One dimension of the so-called 'cotton affair' is
related to Uzbek corruption practices during the Sharaf Rashidov years. Rashi-
dov was accused of manipulating cotton production figures during the Gor-
bachev administration, which consequently launched a crackdown in Uzbekistan.
Among the Uzbek people, this 'cotton affair' assumed symbolic importance
beyond the surface claims of corruption. For many Uzbek nationals, the 'cotton
affair' also became a pretext for Moscow's persecution along ethnic grounds of
local Uzbek officialdom.33 Adil Yaqubov, an Uzbek writer reportedly exposed
the 'cotton monoculture', at the USSR Congress of the People's Deputies, as
an event 'that put the Uzbek people into a worse condition than the African-

































Karimov was also claimed to support this cause, and made a speech commem-
orating the 75th birthday of Sharaf Rashidov in 1992. The following is an
excerpt of that speech which was published later.35
This should not be forgotten that this unique personality (Rashidov) was on the one hand
trying to protect the national interests, on the other hand, he was trying to put into practice
orders, coming from the centre, which were in contrast with the fundamental interests (of
the Uzbek people) ... Even during the worst times, Sharaf Rashidov fulfilled the obliga-
tions of a true son to his nation. He tried to soften orders coming from the centre and (he
was trying) to find money to support the development of our nation. The political
conditions of those days were such that, we were obliged to beg for goods we needed from
the centre. It was given from the wealth taken from us—from the territory of our
Uzbekistan.
The Uzbek president elaborated further in one of his speeches in April 1993,
during a meeting with a group of Uzbek intellectuals about the Uzbek cotton and
gold which was required to be sent to Moscow. According to the calculations of
the president, during the preceding 15 years the centre obtained from Uzbekistan
at least 35 billion dollars worth of gold and cotton.36
With its population of some 22 million, Uzbekistan is one of the leading
countries in the region with considerable potential both in human resources, but
also as a source of economic and social conflict. According to Bahadur Ashanov,
Head of the External Economic Relations Committee for Forecasting and
Statistics in the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan:37
Uzbekistan imports 80% of the wheat, all the tea and sugar, 40% of the meat and meat
products, and 35% of the milk and milk products its residents use. We export more than
70% of our cotton, more than 50% of our fruit. Since Uzbekistan imports 80% of its needs
... we understand that cotton is the only real opportunity for us to earn hard currency.
Cotton monoculture is the only agricultural commodity that Uzbeks can use to
obtain foreign currency. Nevertheless, cotton monoculture also has forced the
country to concentrate on grain production to feed its growing and young
population. More than 60 per cent of the population are children and teenagers
younger than 25 years of age.38 It has also been suggested that this youth factor
will act to meet the demands of other Muslim countries in labour shortages as
relations and diplomatic contacts improve in the future.
As for the transition to the free market economy, Uzbek leadership is taking
the slow path. In this vein, Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated the following:
'I am absolutely sure of the need of transforming the economy (to the free
market economy) only it must be step by step.'39
Uzbekistan and her neighbours
As do all the other Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan still has close economic
and military relations with the old centre, Moscow, and the new Russia.
Relations with Russia have always, for all the republics in the area, occupied the
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States) governments. The old big brother and the attendant ethnic Russians in
each republic were always taken care of for the sake of not hurting relations with
Moscow. Special privileges were extended to the Slavic population. However,
the Uzbek president recently stated that Uzbekistan 'is against dual citizenship'
of the Slavic population residing in the republic.40 Furthermore, Uzbek President
Islam Karimov said that Uzbekistan needs, 'a democratic Russia which accepts
us in an equal and an all-round way, which welcomes our successes and is ready
to hold out its hand and help us, thus finding support, strength, help and
advantage for itself. This is the kind of Russia we consider close to us.'41
It is also interesting to study the aims and future plans of the current Uzbek
leadership towards another neighbouring country, Afghanistan, in which a
considerable number of 'Turkestanis' live. Still another question arises in
determining the existence of a fear by Uzbek officials from the potential
fundamentalists in Tajikistan.42 It has been reported that one in every four
persons in Tajikistan is an Uzbek.43 Could this be the source of fear in the
Karimov government? It would be interesting to know whether Karimov has a
real fear of fundamentalism or whether he only fears losing his position in
Uzbekistan. It was on this point that Karimov complained about the current Tajik
leadership during a news conference organized after Russian premier Viktor
Chernomyrdin visited Uzbekistan, in July 1995. Karimov stated the following:
'I would like to add that the shortsighted leaders of Tajikistan, and above all
those who are currently in power, are acting very shortsightedly in hoping that
someone else's border guards and troops will defend them while they sit it out
in Dushanbe.'44 Policies of the Uzbek leadership towards Tajikistan seem far
more complicated and calculating than the above statements indicate because, as
one analyst reported, 'The Uzbek intervention in Tajikistan could lead to the
identification of the Karimov government with Moscow imperialism despite the
fact that it is Moscow which is being manipulated by Tashkent on the political
situation in Tajikistan.'45
As for China, since its independence Uzbekistan is seeking to establish close
economic ties. Trade between China and Central Asian countries, including
Uzbekistan, has boomed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As of
the last quarter of 1994, China and Uzbekistan have signed 15 agreements on
technical, trade and economic deals. Trade between the two countries reportedly
has risen to 80 million dollars for the first seven months of 1994 against 98
million dollars for all of 1993.46 Although Uzbekistan does not share a border
with China, there are some 20,000 Uzbeks living in the Chinese province of
Xinjiang. At the same time, a small number of Uighurs also live in Uzbek
territory. Xinjiang region is home not only to Uzbeks but to Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Uighurs and other Muslim minorities who share a common heritage with all the
Turko-Muslims of Central Asian republics. Chinese authorities seem especially
cautious about the tensions in the Xinjiang area especially after the independence
of the Central Asian republics. Besides, a group of Uighurs living in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan are a cause of some concern to the Chinese leadership. Chinese

































towards Uighur nationalists in their republic. Any attempt towards encouraging
an 'Eastern Turkestani' independence movement will result in spoiling relations
with China for the Central Asian countries. It seems that the number one priority
of the Chinese side is to prevent any kind of involvement of the newly
independent CAS in any activity in the 'Eastern Turkestan' region. Otherwise
China seems to be ready to improve economic relations with the region.
Conclusion
After four years of independence, Uzbekistan is already well on the way
to consolidating statehood. All the discussions about past history and pre-
revolutionary legacy seem an attempt to get rid of the unwanted relics of the
colonial past. Seeking the roots of the Uzbeks, and establishing natural cultural,
religious, and historical links with the past, are all part of the process of
decolonization. A question immediately comes to mind when we speak of
decolonization: Are the Central Asian countries currently really independent of
the old centre? There are attempts at reinterpreting the past, rewriting the history
of their people, reconsidering and rediscovering their cultural and religious roots,
and rehabilitating their national and cultural symbols. During the process of
decolonization, it is natural not only for Uzbeks but all Turko-Muslim republics
and groups of the old Soviet Union to handle the issues of Turkification and
Islamization together with the derussification of their people.
All of these phenomena can be fully observed in Uzbekistan, which has the
biggest potential for a promising future in economic, political and population
terms. The degree of decolonization has proceeded so successfully that the old
Communist Islam Karimov himself is considering to eliminate the economic and
cultural dependency of Uzbekistan on Moscow. The Uzbek president seeks to
build economic routes to the south of the country, to Karachi; to the west of the
country, to the Persian Gulf; and to the east of the country, to China.47 All
ambitious, and extremely independent plans of action.
Notes and References
1. Uzbek President Islam Karimov himself opposed this idea in his speech during the commemoration day
marking the 75th birthday of the late Sharaf Rashidov. Please see, Islam Karimov, Xalqimizning Otashqalb
Farzandi: Sharaf Rashidov Tavalludining 75 Yilliggiga Bagishlangan Tantanada Suzlangan Nutq
(Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1992), p 5.
2. Islam Karimov, Istiqlal va Ma'naviyat (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1994), p 25.
3. Islam Karimov, Ozbekistanning Oz Istiqlal va Taraqqiyat Yuli (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1992), p 6.
4. Stephen Humphreys, 'Modern Arab historians and the challenge of the Islamic past', Middle Eastern
Lectures, The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies Publication, No 1, 1995, pp
119-131.
5. Haydarbek Bababekov, 'Mustaqillik va Igvaqarlik', Fan va Turmus, Nos 11 & 12, 1992.
6. Cedids are the representatives of a group of Turko-Muslim intellectuals who first wanted to modernize the
educational facilities of their people under the rule of the Russian autocrats in the late 19th and early 20th
century. This author prefers to use 'Cedid' as opposed the Western version of 'Jadid'. However, the term
has not been changed into Cedid when it has appeared in a Western publication.
































UZBEKISTAN IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
8. Ahmadali Asqarov and Boribay Ahmedov, 'Ozbek Xalqining Kelip Ciqis Tarixi', Ozbekistan Awazi, 20
January 1994.
9. According to Stephen Humphreys, op cit, 'A golden age displays to us the era in which society's key
values, beliefs, and institutions were most fully and clearly realized, and thereby it identifies the moral and
structural foundations of that society ... On the most general level, a golden age endows a society with
its very identity and assures it of its place in the world.'
10. Donald Carlisle, 'Geopolitics of Uzbekistan', in Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Yaacov Ro'i (ed.),
The Cummings Centre for Russian and East European Studies, The Cummings Centre Series, (London:
Frank Cass, 1995), pp 90, 91.
11. An interview with Prof. Begali Kasimov by Murad Abdulla, 'Uygangan Millat Marifati', Ozbekistan
Adabiyat va San'ati, 25 March 1994.
12. RFE/RL Uzbek Service archive material, 28 May 1994, cited an article in Vatan entitled 'Milliy Uyganis:
Muammalar, Izlanislar, Tadqiqatlar ... '.
13. Edward Lazzerini, 'Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914'. Unpublished
PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 1973. Also see, Hakan Kirimli, 'National Movements and
National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1917', Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1991.
14. Adeeb Khalid, 'Printing, publishing, and reform in Central Asia', International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, 26, 1994, p 193. Please also see, Adeeb Khalid, 'The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform:
Jadidism in Tsarist Central Asian', Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1993.
15. Abdujabbar Abduvakhitov, 'The Jadid movement and its impact on contemporary Central Asia' in Central
Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, Hafeez Malik (ed.) (New York: St Martin's Press,
1994), pp 71, 72.
16. Ibrahim Yarkin, 'Bati Turkistan, Turk Dunyasi El Kitabi, (Ankara: Turk Kulturunu Arastirma Enstitusu,
1976), pp 1160-1215. The following statement was reported in p 1194; 'Guney Turkistan'da cedidciligin
gelismesinde, Kirimli Gaspirali Ismail Bey'in cikardigi Tercuman gazetesinin, yeni usul ogretime ait
yayinlarla Kazan ve Azerbaycan'dan gelen yayinlarin ve Turkiye'deki yenilesme ve hurriyet hareketlerinin
buyuk tesiri oldu. Namik Kemal'in hurriyeti ve vatan sevgisini oven siirleri ve daha sonralari sair Mehmed
Emin'in (Mehmed Emin Yurdakul), "Ben Bir Turkum" diye baslayan siirleri Turkistan aydinlari arasinda
elden ele dolasarak heyecanla okundu.' (Tercuman newspapers of the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gaspirali and
particularly his publication about the New Method school have played a vital role in the development of
Cedidism in southern Turkistan. At the same time publications from Kazan and Azerbaijan as well as
Turkey also have a share. Poems of Namik Kemal, which dealt with the love of Liberty and fatherland,
as well as the poem of Mehmed Emin (Mehmed Emin Yurdakul) which is entitled 'I am a Turk' have been
read by the intellectuals in Turkistan with great enthusiasm.)
17. Sabir Mirvaliyev, Ozbek Adiblari (Tashkent: Ozbekistan Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyasi 'Fan' Nashriy-
aty, 1993), pp 10-38.
18. Ibid, pp 10-11, 13, 18-19.
19. Ibid, p 19.
20. Nasimcan Rahmanov, 'Turk mi yaki Ozbek mi?' Ozbekistan Avazi, 20 January 1994.
21. Qozgalis
Kisenlaring zeng basqandir, sergek bol kim uzulur;
Tamirimda qozgalisning vahsi qani kopirdi,
Eski fikir, ananeler emdi butkul uzuldu,
Ya bitermen yaki sening saltanating buzulur!
Ey sen meni qul orninda isletguci eferidi!
Titre, qorq kim bagliq quling bas kotergen kuc emdi!
Ibrahim Yarkin, op cit, pp 1200-1201.
(Translation of this poem is as follows:
Beware that your chains are getting rotten,
Wild blood of revolt is boiling in my veins,
Old ideas and traditions are all ending,
Either me or your rein will perish now.
Oh you efendi who made me a slave,
Tremble and frighten that your chained slave is the rebelling force!)
22. Mirvaliyev, op cit, pp 8, 11, 18, 19.

































Directions in Cross-cultural Analysis, Dale F. Eickelman (ed.) (Bloomington: Indiana Press University,
1993), pp 81, 82.
24. Ibid.
25. Islam Karimov, Xalqimizning ..., p 6. Mustaqilliq paydavariga xalqimizning boshiga tushgan oghir
kunlarda qataganlorga uchrab, gunahsiz qurbon bulgan minglab zabardast, unitilmas farzandlari tamal
toshlarini kuygan. Shuning ucin xam mustabvidlik zamonida xalqimiz xotirasidan ataylab ochirilgan
mutabar insonlarning nomlari birin-ketin tiklanayapti. Abdulla Kodiriy v Abdulxamid Chulpon, Abdurauf
Fitrat va Usmon Nosir kabi vatanimiz, millatimiz azadligi yulida s. ketghan onlab simolarning ma'navi
miraslari bugun xalkimiz bisotiga qaytmaqda.
26. Kemal Karpat, paper submitted to the SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University) Washington, DC, 21 March 1994.
27. Islam Karimov, op cit, Ref 25, p 7. Xalqimiz ruxaniyatining sarchashmalaridan bulmish qadimiy va
navkiran Navruz ayemi, diniy qadriyatlarimizdan bulmish Ruza xayti va Qurban Xayti qaytadan xaya-
timizga kirib keldi. Bunday amaliy qadamlar kishilarimizda bugingi va ertangi kunga, xakimiyatga,
raxbarlarga ishanc va xurmat tuygularini uygatadi.
28. Islam Karimov, Istiqlal va Ma'naviyat, p 22.
29. Islam Karimov, ibid, pp 30, 31.
30. Hidayet Diktas, 'Milletiyle Butunlesen Lider: Nazarbayev', Zaman, 6 October 1995, p 4. Hidayet Diktas
is Almati correspondent of Zaman-Kazakstan.
31. A Reuter news item dated 23 September 1994, RFE/RL archive material, FF0112.
32. Muhammmed Salih, 'Ozbekistan'da Demokratiklesme Uzerine', Bitig, November 1995, No 10, pp 14-15.
A publication of the Research Centre for Turkestan and Azerbaijan, Haarlem, the Netherlands.
33. Stephen K. Batalden and Sandra L. Batalden, The Newly Independent States of Eurasia: Handbook of
Former Soviet Republics (Phoenix, Arizona: The Oryx Press, 1993), p 174.
34. RFE/RL Uzbek Service Archive material, 2 September 1994.
35. Islam Karimov, Xalqimizning Otashqalb Farzandi ... , p 15.
36. Islam Karimov, Istiqlal va Ma'naviyat, p 27.
37. Phillip Petersen, Security policy in post-Soviet Central Asia, European Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring
1995), pp 149-150.
38. Islam Karimov, Ozbekistanning Oz Istiqlal ... p 12.
39. Islam Karimov, Yangi uy qurmay turib, eskisini buzmang (Do not destroy your old house before you finish
building the new) (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1993), p 7.
40. SWB, SU/2369 G/2, 31 July 1995.
41. SWB, SU/2369 G/3, 31 July 1995.
42. Petersen, op cit, p 152. Petersen wrote the following: ' . . . The Uzbek intervention in Tajikistan could lead
to the identification of the Karimov government with Moscow imperialism despite the fact that it is
Moscow which is being manipulated by Tashkent on the political situation in Tajikistan.'
43. Petersen, op cit, p 144.
44. SWB, SU/2369 G/3, 31 July 1995.
45. Petersen, op cit, p 152.
46. Andre Grabot, 'Uzbekistan President in China', AFP, 23 October 1994, RFE/RL Archive material FF0054,
23 October 1994.
47. Islam Karimov, Istiqlal va Ma'naviyat, p 28.
64
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
B
ilk
en
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] 
at
 0
4:
37
 3
0 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
7 
